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ABSTRACT
Although not as frequent in nature as ignitions on continuous miner or longwall faces, ignitions of methane on roof bolters have
caused serious injuries to underground coal miners. After reviewing the accident reports for all roofbolter ignitions from 1981
to 1998, a summary of the forty-one accidents has been developed. Of interest in the database is the ignition source, method
offace ventilation, local velocity, methane liberation, size of the methane body ignited, and the duration of the flame. Three
example ignitions are included.
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INTRODUCTION
Upon notification of a methane ignition, MSHA enforcement
personnel conduct an investigation of the accident. The
reports are kept in an accident database by MSHA Technical
Support for future reference. Ignitions on roof bolters were
reviewed to determine similarities and trends for this type of
accident. The database was searched from 1981 to 1998,
including all reported methane i~tions. Most ignitions did
not cause serious injury. However, the potential for disaster
does exist as seen in the accident database analysis. This
paper summarizes the data from 41 accident investigation
reports for ignitions on roofbolting machines in underground
bituminous coal mines.

TYPICAL BOLTER IGNITIONS
With few exceptions, the typical roofbolter ignition has been
a non-injury accident. Injuries to miners as a direct result of
ignitions have occurred in cases where ventilation controls
were not properly maintained, required airflow quantities
were not maintained, or permissibility of equipment was not
maintained.
Most ignitions required miners to extinguish flames using
fire extinguishers, rock dust or water. Only six were selfextinguishing. Most events lasted less than six minutes.
Ignitions lasting more than one minute were normally

ignitions which ignited methane feeders in the face or along
the rib. While methane is generally ignited at the drill hole,
three in four ignitions propagated beyond the drill hole.
Many ignitions seem to coincide with unusual mining
conditions. Many reports indicate unusually hard roof
conditions and excessive bit wear as contributing factors.
Other circumstances include bolting in caved areas, where
methane accumulations are more likely to occur. It seems a
significant factor in these ignitions is the mine methane
liberation rate.

METHANE LIBERATION
The distribution of methane liberation rates for all
underground coal mines is shown in Figure 1. Approximately
I 0 percent of the mines liberate in excess of 200,000 cubic
feet of methane per day, and 5 percent exceed one million
cubic feet in a single day. Bolter methane ignitions have
occurred in a small percentage of all underground mines,
which are all considered to be some of the gassiest. For all
forty one ignitions, mine methane liberation exceeded
850,000 cubic feet per day.
Two of the 41 ignition accident reports indicated methane
tests were not made prior to bolting. Of the remaining
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thirty-nine, measured levels did not exceed 1 percent. The
highest methane reading reported was 0.9 percent prior to
bolting.
"Legal" gas checks are required by 30 CFR 75.362 before
a bolter is taken into or operated in a working place. Testing
is also required every 20 minutes while in the working place.
All tests must be taken while under supported roof, which in
the case of a roof bolter requires the use of an extendable
probe to test the area between the bolter and the face.
The location of tests is specified in 30 CFR 75.323 as at
least one foot from the roof, face, ribs and floor. This may be
one reason bolter operators do not detect very thin methane
accumulations in pockets or layers along the roof.
Another is that it is very difficult to detect thin layers
along the roof (Mitchell, 1996). In describing the ignitions,
accident reports indicate the methane bodies are very small
and are not of an ignitable concentration within the entire
working place. Most were identified as thin layers along the
roof. Methane layers can be avoided by providing adequate air
velocity in the bolting place. Velocities required to control
layering in typical working places may be as high as 200 feet
per minute or more depending upon the methane inflow rate
(Hartman, 1997).

IGNITION SOURCES
Accident reports identified ignition sources in all but two of
the ignitions. One was ignited by equipment electrical
conductors as the bolter was not maintained in permissible
condition. The remaining 38 accidents were caused by similar
circumstances, including overheated drill steels, frictional
heating, overheated bits or sparking bits. A graph of the
ignition sources is included in Figure 2. All of the 38
accidents were ignited at the drill hole.
Ten of the ignitions were confined to the immediate drill
hole location. Eighteen propagated to the face and 9
propagated both to the face and outby the bolting machine.
Three propagated to the rib from the bolt hole.

FACE VENTILATION :METHOD
Much work has been completed by MSHA and the former US
Bureau of Mines concerning the comparison of the effectiveness of blowing and exhausting face ventilation systems.
Blowing systems have a greater effectiveness in controlling
methane, while exhaust systems are more effective for dust
control (Dalzell, 1966, Mundell, 1977).
While some ventilation systems were not described within
the accident reports, most did report the type of face
ventilation system used while bolting (Figure 3). The majori-

ty (59 percent) of the ignitions occurred on sections using
exhaust ventilation. A total of 28 percent used blowing face
ventilation. or a combination of blowing and exhausting
ventilation. Five accident reports indicated adequate
ventilation was not provided to the bolter as required by the
approved ventilation plan.

INJURIES
Most bolter ignitions do not cause injuries to equipment
operators. Of the 10 injuries reported, only three occurred as
a direct result of the initial ignition. All three of these injuries
occurred in the two ignitions where no methane checks were
made prior to bolting.
The remaining seven were due to firefighting activities.
One operator fell off of his machine and another received
burns in one accident. Five persons were burned in a
secondary ignition while rock dusting in the cavity of a fall
area.

EXAMPLES
The following report excerpts have been taken from actual
MSHA accident investigation reports. All three are for
accidents which occurred in Alabama -sixty-three percent of
all roofbolter ignitions from this study happened in Alabama
mines.
Example 1
The greatest number of injuries caused by a bolter ignition
was in 1990 at a mine in Alabama. The mine liberated 14.4
million cubic feet of methane daily.
Approximately 21 feet of the roof 2 Y2 feet thick near the
face in an en try had fallen out and needed to be cleaned up
before bolting in the place could be completed. The entry was
being bolted up to the fall. Methane checks prior to bolting
indicated 0. 8 to 0. 9 percent methane was present in the place.
The bolter operator was in the process of spinning the bolt
resin for a bolt in the fourth row in the place which was just
outby the fall as shown in Figure 4. This location was
approximately 18 feet from the face. Sparks caused by contact
between the roof bolt plate and strap ignited a methane
mixture. The flames were extinguished by using four fire
extinguishers.
The miners, after concluding the flames were extinguished,
backed out the bolter and trammed in a scoop to rock dust the
area. After applying dust for a few seconds, flames started
from the face area and came outby over the men causing five
miners to be treated for burns, smoke inhalation and shock.
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The flames were extinguished with water and foam from a
foam generator. The methane body in the cavity had not been
extinguished prior to rock dusting. The slow burning body
became explosive with the disturbance caused by the rock
dusting.
The section used a blowing face ventilation system- however,
the blowing curtain was not installed as per the requirements
0f the approved mine ventilation plan. An exhaust curtain
was installed with the air quantity behind the curtain
measured to be 17,360 cubic feet per minute.
Example 2

---
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This third example also occurred at an Alabama mine in
1982. The mine liberated over 20 million cubic feet of
methane each day. Methane checks prior to bolting indicated
0.4 to 0. 7 percent methane was present no closer than 12
inches from the roof, ribs and faces in the bolting place. The
section used an exhausting face ventilation system. The
curtain provided 27,000 cubic feet per minute to the face area
as measured at the end of the curtain, and was 6 Y2 feet from
the face at the time of the ignition.
The bolter operator was drilling through extremely hard
sandy shale in the roof when the drill steel became stuck.
While lowering the steel from the hole, it fell against the face,
igniting the body of methane. The flames were extinguished
by using a fire extinguisher. This accident occurred in spite
of the ventilation provided.

17,360 cfm

CONCLUSIONS
Most roof bolting ignitions can be avoided by maintaining
ventilation requirements and making required examinations
for methane. Awareness of potential for methane layering is
also important for bolter operators for identifying this
potential hazard. Additional tests for methane layering nearer
to the roof, and additional ventilation measures in the gassiest
seams, would decrease the potential for ignitions and methane
layering.
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Figure 2. Roof bolter ignition sources.

Figure 3. Type offace ventilation system used in mines with ignitions.

